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Metalogical Observations About Underdetermination
Of Theories By Empirical Data 
The thesis that scientific theories are undetermined by empirical
data (hereafter the thesis  TU) belongs to the most important ele-
ments  of  the  contemporary  philosophy of  science.  In particular,
TU is usually considered as a very serious argument for an essen-
tial dependence of experience data on theories.  TU is formulated
in two versions1 strong (TU1) and weak (TU2): 
(TU1) For every theory TH which is accepted on the basis of an
experience E there is at least one theory TH’ such that 
a) TH’ is acceptable; 
b) TH and TH’ are empirically equivalent; 
c) TH and TH’ are mutually incoherent; 
(TU2) There are always alternative theories which 
(a) have an empirical confirmation; 
(b)  have essentially  different  worlds  as  their  models,  that  is,
such that 
mutually contradictory statements are valid in them. 
I will treat theories and empirical data as sets of sentences. If a
set TH belongs to theories, TH = CnTH. It means that theories are
closed under the consequence operation (Cn denotes here the con-
sequence operation associated with classical logic). Moreover, I as-
sume that our theories are axiomatizable, that is, for any theory
1 See M. Hesse, “The Hunt for Scientific Reason”, in: PSA 1980, v. II, ed. by P.D.




TH, there is a set  AXTH such that  TH =  Cn AXTH  ; symbol KAXTH
will denote the conjunction of axioms belonging to  AXTH. That a
theory TH is acceptable on the base E (consisting of sentences as-
sumed to be true) means that if  A  E, then  A  CnKAXTH  . It is
equivalent to the condition:  E   CnAXTH  or  E   CnTH.  If  TH is
strictly universal (I will assume that), E  CnKAXTH. Furthermore,
since KAXTH  E = , we have that for any A  KAXTH, A  CnE.
Both (TU1) and (TU2) are existential statements which assert the
existence of sets satisfying the prescribed conditions. I will not en-
ter into a controversial problem whether the history of science con-
firms (TU1) or even (TU2). Hence, I regard both theses as asserting
that such theories are possible. Hence, the assertion that there are
(exist) sets falling under (TU1) or (TU2) should be understood in
the same way as any existential statement in set theory. 
Assume that the content of (TU1) is represented by 
(1) For any theory TH acceptable on the basis of E, there is ano-
ther theory TH’ such that 
(a) E  CnKAXTH’; 
(b) for every E, E  CnKAXTH if and only if E  CnKAXTH’; 
(c) TH, TH’ and E are internally consistent; 
(d) TH  E and TH’  E are consistent; 
(e) TH and TH’ are mutually inconsistent. 
In order to explain some problems concerning (1) we can use
the concept of branchable sets of sentences2. Here is the definition
(and a basic fact about branchable sets). 
(2) (a) A consistent set X of sentences is branchable at a sentence
A if and only if the sets X  {A} and X  {A} are consistent; 
X is branchable if and only if there is at least one sentence such
that X is branchable at A; 
X is branchable if and only if it is incomplete. 
It might seem that (1) suggests that  E is branchable at  KAXTH,
because E is consistent and incomplete and the sets  E  {KAXTH}
and  E   { KAXTH} are consistent;  of  course,  E is branchable at
KAXTH’ for  similar reasons.  However,  it  leads  to a  consequence
2 See G.  Asse,  Einführung in die mathematische Logik, Teil II, Leipzig: Teubner,
1972, p. 168.
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which is difficult to be accepted. Consider an arbitrary A belonging
to E. By the assumptions about E,  TH and TH’, we have that A 
Cn{KAXTH} and  A   Cn{ KAXTH’}.  It entails, by axioms for  Cn,
that A  Cn, that is to logic. However, it means that  A is a the-
orem of logic and cannot represent any piece of synthetic empirical
data. At first sight, two possible solutions come to mind. The first
is to admit that A has one meaning in the context of TH, but a dif-
ferent one with respect to TH’. Yet it raises the problem how TH
and  TH’ can be empirically equivalent in this situation, because
they work with different data. Another way out consists in taking
the set E  {KAXTH } as branchable, but it is unclear for which sen-
tences, interesting from the point of view of TH, it holds. 
The relative Lindenbaum theorem on maximalization3 is  ano-
ther metalogical device which can be used in analysis of TU. The
theorem is this: 
(3) If X is a consistent set of sentences and A  X, then there is a
set Y such that 
(a)Y = CnY; 
(b) CnX  Y; 
(c) A  Y; 
(d) for every B, A  Cn(Y  {B}). 
This theorem asserts that for every consistent set of sentences X
and every sentence A which does not belong to consequences of X,
there is a maximally consistent set Y (an oversystem of X) relative-
ly to A. The extension of X to Y is not unique. There are many (in
fact,  at  least  countable  infinitely)  oversystems  to  a  given set  X.
Now (3) applies to the considered problem, because E is consistent
and KAXTH  E. 
Thus we can treat theories as maximally consistent extensions
of empirical data with respect to a given axiomatics. It does not im-
ply that theories are simple inductive generalizations of data. They
are only reconstructed as extensions of data; in fact, (3) is not an
effective  theorem,  because  it  asserts  that  something  (a  maximal
oversystem) exists, but without saying how it is to be constructed.
Returning to (TU1), if there is a theory TH which implies E (in this
case, TH and E are mutually consistent), (3) guarantees the existen-
ce of an alternative theory  TH’  entailing  E, but inconsistent with
3 W.A. Pogorzelski, Notions and Theorems of Elementary Formal Logic, Bialystok:
Warsaw University – Bialystok Branch, 1994, p. 210–219.
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TH. However, not all constraints stated by (1) are satisfied. In par-
ticular, the condition (1b) fails. Clearly, since TH is based on AXTH
but  TH’ implies  KAXTH  , both considered theories have to have
different sets of logical consequences.  Assume that  E  =  E’.  If  so,
differences between mutually inconsistent theoretical parts of  TH
and  TH’  are simply redundant or artificial;  otherwise,  both the-
ories are not empirically equivalent in any reasonable sense. It en-
tails that we can regard TH and TH’ as empirically equivalent only
modulo the already given E. Although TH and TH’ are acceptable,
they are so (or at least, can be) not to the same degree. Moreover,
nothing  blocks  unnatural  extensions  by  branchability  or  taking
oversystems. Thus, the defender of (TU1) should prescribe addi-
tional  conditions constraining natural  alternatives  for given the-
ories. However, it also does not guarantee that the condition (2b)
will be preserved. The above argumentation suggests that (TU) in
its strong formulation fails. 
(TU2), i. e., the weak thesis, omits (2b). Instead, it requires that
alternative theories have an empirical confirmation, which is not
the same. They must imply the same already acquired  E, but not
arbitrary data. More formally, the content of (TU2) is represented
by 
(4) For any theory TH acceptable on the basis of E, there is ano-
ther theory TH’ and data E’ such that 
(a) E and E’ at least partly overlap;
(b) E  CnKAXTH’; 
(c) E’  CnKAXTH’; 
(d) TH, TH’ and E are internally consistent; 
(e) TH  E, TH’  E and E  E’ are consistent; 
(f) TH  and  TH’  have different models in the following sense:
there is a sentence A  TH  TH’, but it is true in one model and
false in the second. 
The last condition is equivalent to the clause that TH and TH’
are mutually inconsistent, but, according to (TU2) in the version
given above, it has a semantic formulation. Although the original
version particularly stresses that alternative theories have different
models or generate different world-pictures, the main point of dif-
ference consists in rejecting the condition (1b), that is, the require-
ment that  TH and TH’ are empirically equivalent. Now, they are
confirmed by data which at least partly overlap (4a), but are also
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mutually consistent (4e). The case in which  E  and  E’ form an in-
consistent set seems uninteresting for the considered problem. Ho-
wever, the novelties do not help very much. In particular, brancha-
bility and (3) are applicable to (TU2)  and license various exten-
sions of  E  and  E’. In particular, we will have trouble with (4e). I
take this condition in a radical sense, that is, I interpret difference
via inconsistency. There are of course other ways. One can under-
stand the difference in question as generating models which are
mutual restrictions or extensions. Nevertheless, I think that such
modest interpretations are not especially interesting in the context
of (TU) and it motivates (4e). Since, by (4d), E and E’ are mutually
consistent, the inconsistency prescribed by (4e) lays on the theore-
tical level. It means that TH and TH’ are mutually inconsistent in
their theoretical parts. The only interesting situation arises when E
and  E’  are different (but not inconsistent), because otherwise we
come to the argument that empirical sentences are tautologies, be-
cause any such sentence belongs to consequences of assumptions
which are inconsistent. On the other hand, if E and E’ are different,
it means only that either they force a radical theory change, that is,
replacing a theoretical postulate by its negation, or a supplementa-
tion of the old theory by a new axiom. In the first case, it is difficult
to say that both theories generate acceptable world-pictures, but in
the second case, we have no reason to apply (4e), because the new
theory is an extension of the old one. Once more we can appeal to
(IT). If this thesis is accepted in its radical form (no theories are
commensurable), (TU2) receives a strong argument. On the other
hand, (IT) raises several objections (see Pearce 1986) and by no me-
ans is obvious. Independently of the acceptance of (IT) it is per-
haps interesting to observe, that (TU) in any of its forms rather as-
sumes (IT) than gives a justification to it. If (TU) is separated from
(IT) and taken in its weak form, it only notes a trivial fact that no
set of empirical data uniquely forces a theory which explains them.
Metalogic shows that different completions of data by theories are
a  normal  thing,  but  also  makes  clear  that  applications  of  such
terms as “equivalence” or “model” cannot be arbitrary and gover-
ned only by rough intuitions. 
(TU) in its both formulations has obvious consequences for the
debate between realism and anti-realism. Let us agree that realism
maintains something like that: 
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(5) Theories refer to the real world. 
Now, (TU1) as based on (IT) is explicitly anti-realistic. Howe-
ver, (TU2) is always considered (see Hesse 1980) as dangerous for
realism, because it equalizes different “real” worlds. It seems that
this conclusion is not justified. In the light of the above given argu-
ments, (TU2) just does not regard different models of theories as
representations of the real world to the same degree. Several prag-
matic factors (see Sintonen 1984) select arguments pro and contra
that such and such representation is better (or worse) than its ri-
vals. For example, the realist can maintain that if  E  E’, then we
have collected new data for regarding the model of TH’ as a better
approximation of the real world than the model of TH. Of course,
this argument may be erroneous, but there are no sound reasons in
order to claim that the realist is infallible. 
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